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US-Latin American Relations in a Second Trump Administration

 

Hector Schamis*

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Latin-Americans often believe that Washington does not care about them. An idea with little material basis, it could perhaps never have been farther from the truth than it is today. Consider this. On January 14, upon departure from office, the Biden administration notified Congress of its intent to lift the U.S. designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism. As part of a deal facilitated by the Catholic Church, the Cuban government promised to free political prisoners and the U.S. government pledged to ease some economic pressure on the island, reversing the first Trump administration’s approach as outlined in the June 2017 memorandum.

 

The next day, January 15, Marco Rubio appeared before the Senate Foreign Relation Committee for his confirmation hearing as Secretary of State. He was blunt in his testimony: “Inour very own hemisphere, despots and narco-terrorists take advantage of open borders to drive mass migration, traffic women and children, and flood our communities with fentanyl and violent criminals.” From day one, therefore, the incoming Trump administration has taken up the issue of Cuba and other dictatorships throughout the hemisphere. The then-Secretary-designate elaborated on this general assertion. He challenged Biden’s decision straightforwardly: “Cuba aids organizations like the FARC and ELN in Colombia,” he argued, “is friendly to Hamas and Hezbollah, has ties to Iran, hosts espionage stations for China and Russia, and houses U.S. fugitives.” Once confirmed, he reinstated Cuba’s State Sponsor of

Terrorism Designation. Rubio also had strong words for the Venezuelan regime, criticizing the Biden administration for having “been played about a free election” in which, in the end, Maduro falsely claimed victory over Edmundo Gonzalez. He condemned the sanctions relief policy by which “companies like Chevron are providing billions of dollars of money into the regime's coffers.” “Venezuela,” he concluded, “is governed by a narco-trafficking organization that has empowered itself of a nation state.”

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He chastised the Nicaraguan regime for persecuting the Catholic Church and silencing dissenting voices. He accused it of contributing to the migratory crisis because “the Nicaraguan regime is allowing people to fly to Nicaragua without visas from anywhere in the world and then transit to the United States.” He also decried the Ortega regime for inviting Russia to

“establish a military presence in Nicaragua, which represents a threat to our national security that must be addressed.”

The Western Hemisphere thus occupies a crucial place on the agenda of the second Trump administration. That Central America has been chosen to be Secretary Rubio’s destination for his first trip abroad speaks to that; the subsequent Trump-Petro quarrel over deportations emphasizes it even more. With threats of a trade war beginning and migration clashes already developing, Latin America has certainly entered center-stage.

Yet this is not only because of intractable challenges such as irregular migration and drug trafficking. The U.S. southern neighbors are also potential partners on a range of issues, from strengthening supply chains in food, minerals, and energy, to defending democracy and human rights as well as promoting nearshoring and intra-regional trade. The interplay of these issues is key to understanding the risks as much as the opportunities. That should be the conversation in

the Americas.

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Indeed, immigration is on top of the foreign policy agenda, for it is an established fact that several of these migratory flows have been promoted and deployed by organized crime, often in collusion with governments hostile to the United States such as Maduro’s. These integrated and diversified criminal conglomerates—that is their “business model,” if you will—have become parastatal agents. Part of Venezuela’s foreign policy is outsourced to them. These entities first drive the poorest and most vulnerable people out of their own countries, towns, and homes, and then traffic them north through the Darien just as they traffic cocaine, gold and coltan. The caravans that go in that direction today, as much as they were heading south in the past, are permeated by organized crime, mixed with genuine migrants and with the Latino population once in the U.S. Hence the anxiety about migration among these communities, an issue that sheds light on the robust Latino vote for Trump last November. A relevant example is the case of “Tren de Aragua,” an organization that operates throughout the continent. As in Chile, with the murder of an exiled Venezuelan naval officer. As in the U.S., with its criminal actions in Colorado, New York, and Texas, among other states. This has alerted the authorities: the migration issue is not so much about the labor market as it is about national security. The Biden administration had seen it that way, too. In fact, in 2024 deportations reached the highest record since 2014, then under Obama. In other words, both Obama and Biden deported more foreigners than Trump during his first administration. That being the case, there should be bipartisan support for immigration policies that control the nation's borders and regulate migration flows in a rational way, as Trump proposes. Organized crime and autocracy have gone hand in hand in the hemisphere. Both problems have to be addressed simultaneously. This relationship has seriously debilitated the rule of law, creating a pervasive environment of lawlessness and insecurity, which also fosters migration and enables terrorist acts.

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Curiously absent from this discussion is the fact that in March, 2020, a federal court in the Southern District of New York indicted senior officials of the Venezuelan dictatorship and offered rewards for information leading to their capture. Maduro and 14 other members of his egime were charged. The case details the Venezuelan dictatorship ties to the Cartel of the Suns and the dissident FARC in a crime that is typified as “narco-terrorism.” Through it the Maduro

regime exports autocracy. At the same time, United States's federal agencies have amply documented Cuba's role in

keeping Maduro in power. It has been acknowledged that his personal security, airport control, the electoral roll, and military counterintelligence, including the torture of dissident officers in captivity, are in the hands of the Cuban intelligence apparatus. Without Cuba, Maduro would have fallen long ago. By transitive property, the Cuban regime sponsors (narco) terrorism in Caracas as well. Given the above, there should be a conversation about democracy and the rule of law in the region. To the extent that only democracy can uphold the rule of law, confronting autocracies that have been captured by organized crime requires to address these issues concurrently.

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There is no such thing as dealing with one issue at a time when it comes to the multiple consequences of organized crime.

Likewise, widespread poverty also factors in. At a time of persistent talk of tariffs and other trade restrictions, development in the Americas also appears as a necessary condition to confront threats to U.S. national security. For, if the goal is to reduce migration pressures, keeping jobs at home in Latin America is part of the equation. Access to the U.S. market for

Latin-American goods should thus be a necessary condition.

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That is, in fact, the approach of the “Americas Act,” a bill introduced to Congress last March that seeks to establish a mechanism for a permanent trade partnership in the hemisphere. Bipartisan and bicameral, the bill represents a multibillion-dollar effort to expand intra- hemispheric trade, generating investment opportunities and creating jobs, thereby addressing the root causes of migration. Lawmakers recognize that, despite the strong ties that bind the hemisphere together, the United States has not offered the rest of the Americas a compelling alternative to China's economic projection.

 

A comprehensive agenda on migration, illegal drugs, and national security must therefore also include the issue of rule of law, poverty and development in the Americas.

@hectorschamis

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*The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the policies or positions of The Center for Latin America Convergence (CCLatam) as an organization.

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